by Dr. Mordechai Kedar and David Yerushalmi, Esq.
Abstract
A random survey of 100 representative mosques in the U.S. was conducted to measure the correlation between Sharia adherence and dogma calling for violence against non-believers. Of the 100 mosques surveyed, 51% had texts on site rated as severely advocating violence; 30% had texts rated as moderately advocating violence; and 19% had no violent texts at all.
Mosques that presented as Sharia adherent were more likely to feature violence-positive texts on site than were their non-Sharia-adherent counterparts. In 84.5% of the mosques, the imam recommended studying violence-positive texts. The leadership at Sharia-adherent mosques was more likely to recommend that a worshipper study violence-positive texts than leadership at non-Sharia-adherent mosques. Fifty-eight percent of the mosques invited guest imams known to promote violent jihad. The leadership of mosques that featured violence-positive literature was more likely to invite guest imams who were known to promote violent jihad than was the leadership of mosques that did not feature violence-positive literature on mosque premises. Preface[1]
The debate over the connection between Islam and its legal doctrine and system known as Sharia on the one hand and terrorism committed in the name of Islam on the other rages on among counter terrorism professionals, academics, policy experts, theologians, and politicians. Much of this debate centers on the evidence that the perpetrators of violence in the name of Islam source the moral, theological, and legal motivations and justifications for their actions in Sharia. Much of the opposition to this focus on Sharia centers on the argument that Sharia is and has been historically malleable and exploited for good and bad causes.
The authors and the editors of Perspectives on Terrorism wish to acknowledge and express gratitude to the Middle East Quarterly, which originally published the results of this study in its Summer 2011 edition (available online at http://www.meforum.org/2931/american-mosques) for granting permission to republish the results of this study in a more expansive online format.
This study seeks to enter this fray but at a more empirical level. Since we know that mosques are in fact a situs of recruitment and “radicalization” for terrorism committed in the name of Islam, this study seeks to enter into that domain to determine if there is an empirical correlation between actual, manifest Sharia-related behaviors and the presence of violent and jihad-based literature, and further, the promotion of that literature. While the presence of violent and jihad-based literature alone does not necessarily suggest the worshippers at such a mosque adopt the violent literature’s approach to the use of violence, if the imams at such mosques also promote the literature, and if those mosques are more likely to invite guest imams and speakers who are known to promote violent jihad, the presence of these factors together would be strongly suggestive of an environment prone to jihad recruitment. Thus, this study also seeks to determine if the spiritual leadership in these mosques is supportive of this genre of literature.
Introduction
While scholarly inquiry into the root causes and factors supportive of the political violence known as terrorism has accelerated since the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States; a survey of research in the field reveals a lag in empirical studies that attempt to measure the relationship between specific variables and terrorism phenomena or support for terrorism. Most studies in the field of terrorism research are either based upon anecdotal or retrospective analysis of known data from prior reports of terrorism using multiple regression analysis. [2] Most of these studies disconfirm simplistic causative theories for terrorism, such as socio-economic deprivation. [3]
A 2007 study by Paul Gill noted that prior scholarship had not explored the complex interactions between the individual who becomes a suicide bomber, the terrorist organization that sponsors suicide bombers, and the society that supports the terrorist and terrorist organization. Instead, scholarship had taken a non-integrated approach and previous studies had focused on only one of these three dimensions. [4] The Gill study found, among other things, that the terrorist organization seeks societal support by creating a “culture of martyrdom” and that a theme common to suicide bombers, despite many differences, was that they received support of a community that esteemed the concept of martyrdom. [5] The Gill study advanced scholarship in the area of terrorism research by studying the complex dynamics at work between a terrorist organization, society, and individuals and also proposing that the interplay between those three dimensions enables radicalization and terrorist attacks. [6]
Recent studies, when viewed together, raise the prospect that all three dimensions may be present in highly Sharia-adherent mosques, such as those frequented by Salafists.This is significant because the mosque would be a convenient locus for making observations and gathering data in an attempt to measure the relationship between specific variables and support for terrorism if all three dimensions that enable radicalization and terrorist attacks are present in these highly Sharia-adherentmosques.
A study by Sageman found a connection between highly Sharia-adherent Salafist Islam and violent jihad. This study’s authors emphasize that the connection Sageman noticed between Islam and violent jihad concerns a particular stream of highly Sharia-adherent Islam and not Islam generically. The Sageman study found that 97% of the jihadists studied became increasingly devoted to highlySharia-adherent Salafist Islam on their path to radicalization despite adhering to various devotional levels during their youths. [7] This noted increase in religious devotion to Sharia-adherent Salafist Islam was measured by outwardly observable behaviors that are objectively linked to Sharia-adherence such as wearing traditional Arabic, Pakistani, or Afghan clothing and growing beards. [8]
The mosque is a societal apparatus that might serve as a support mechanism for the violent jihad. Consistent with the findings of the Sageman study, a study conducted by the New York Police Department noted that, in the mosque context, high levels of Sharia adherence may relate to support for violent jihad. [9] Specifically the NYPD study found that highly Sharia-adherent mosques have played a prominent role in radicalizing several groups who conspired to commit acts of terrorism in the name of Islam, including some groups who were successful in carrying out high-profile attacks. [10] One plausible explanation for why the highly Sharia-adherent mosque is believed to have a connection to the radicalization process is that the global jihad is an Islamic revivalist movement centered on a common Sharia-drivenmission[11] and the mosque serves as a locus for the intensification of religious beliefs. [12]
Further raising the profile of highly Sharia-adherent mosques is the fact that several of these mosques are known to contain brokers to the violent jihad; and in some instances, the broker may even be the mosque’s imam. [13] The broker role may also be filled by ostensibly non-violent groups such as the Tablighi Jamaat, which counts several alumnae as members of the violent jihad. [14] Additionally, these mosques have been the situs where other radicals have met “spiritual sanctioners” who foster an “us-versus-them” perspective and provide moral justification for engaging in violent jihad. [15] The “spiritual sanctioner” presents jihad as a religious duty situated within traditional Sharia and the sanctioner’s commitment to jihad is often the primary determinant of whether a radicalized group will engage in violent jihad. [16]
The presence of an imam or other respected member who serves as a “spiritual sanctioner” or even as a broker[17] to jihad is critical because a respected Islamic scholar who provides justification for violence against “the other” and presents jihad as a religious duty significantly influences the decisions made by one who is seeking a more religiously devout lifestyle. [18] The presence of pro-jihadimams and mosque members, and even ostensibly non-violent Sharia-advocating groups, serve to support a “culture of martyrdom” by providing moral justification for engaging in violent jihad and making available an avenue to participate in violent jihad. The presence of groups like the Tablighi Jamaat, as well as the presence of individual brokers and “spiritual sanctioners” within the highly Sharia-adherent mosques, raises concerns that activities and the atmosphere inside highly Sharia-adherent mosques contribute to the creation or maintenance of a “culture of martyrom” where violence and jihad are accepted or encouraged.
In addition to the roles played by increased devotion to a highly Sharia-adherent strain of Islam, studies have also noticed a connection between violence-positive Islamic literature and violent jihad. A study by Quintan Wiktorowicz noted that the modern violent jihad,the current avatar of which is Al Qaeda and various groups inspired by Al Qaeda, relies on textual works to legitimize their violent activities. The texts that these jihadist groups rely on date from the medieval period, for example works by Ibn Kathir and Ibn Taymiyya, to the modern period, which includes the works of Abul A'la Maududi and Sayyid Qutb. [19] According to Wiktorowicz, violent Salafists such as Al Qaeda legitimize their violent activities by applying principles set forth in these texts in ways that take a more expansive and permissive view regarding the use of violence than has been allowed by alternative historical interpretations of these texts. [20] However, Wiktorowicz concedes that under certain circumstances these same texts can be used persuasively to garner the support of otherwise non-violent Salafists for the intentional targeting of the American civilian population. [21] Thus, violence-positive texts by Islamic thinkers and exegetes can be exploited not only to sanction engaging in violent jihad, but can also be utilized to gain the support of non-violentSalafists for the intentional killing of civilians.
These anecdotal studies, when viewed together, suggest that a relationship might be present between high levels of Sharia adherence, violence-positive Islamic literature, and institutional support for violence and violent jihad within the context of the highly Sharia-adherent mosque. The role authoritative, Sharia-centric Islam plays in creating or maintaining a culture that manifests behaviors that demonstrate esteem for political violence against an outgroup deserves investigation because the various Islamic terrorist groups and individualjihadists, for all their geographic, political, and ideological differences, embrace Sharia as their doctrinal legal and political authority for the establishment of a political order or state based on Islamic law as their goal.[22]
Moreover, these Islamic terrorist groups and individual jihadists cite Sharia as their legal and political justification for the political violence they term jihad and those who oppose them term terrorism. To date, almost all of the professional and academic work in the area of terrorism carried out in the name of Islam has been anecdotal surveys or case studies tracing backwards the personal history profiles of different Islamic terrorists and the socio-economic, and political environments from whence they came after the fact (either post mortem or post-capture).[23] There are almost no empirical studies attempting to identify specific behavioral variables (such as various indicia ofSharia-adherence) which might positively correlate with behaviors associated with a willingness to tolerate, accept, or even engage in terrorism.
One notable exception to this trend was a group of four studies conducted by Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan which sought to measure the association between religious belief versus coalitional commitment with attitudes directly supportive of terrorism or attitudes suggesting support for terrorism.[24] Religious belief was defined and measured by the subject self-reporting his or her frequency of prayer. [25] Coalitional commitment was defined and measured by the frequency with which the subject attended communal religious services at a house of worship. [26] The study concluded that a relationship exists between frequency of mosque attendance (coalitional commitment) and the likelihood that a person will support suicide attacks. [27] The study also concluded that there was no empirical evidence to support the religious-belief hypothesis which posits that support for suicide bombings is linked to some measurable index of religious devotion (prayer in this study). [28]
However, the study’s methodology as it relates to gathering prayer frequency data may have been susceptible to weakness that introduced bias and led to a faulty conclusion. The study invited over reporting by relying on Muslims to self report their prayer frequency. A Muslim would be under social and/or psychological pressures to over report his prayer frequency because status as a good or pious Muslim is linked to whether a Muslim fulfills his religious obligation to pray five times daily. [29] Status as a good or pious Muslim is not dependent on attending mosque with a high degree of frequency. A Muslim is permitted to pray outside of a mosque environment when necessary. [30] Hence, the pressure to over report, which exists for self-reporting prayer frequency, is not present when a Muslim reports how frequently he or she attends mosque. Moreover, the measure of mosque attendance frequency is both a measure of coalitional commitment and religious devotion.
In the two Palestinian surveys from the Ginges study, 69.3% of the respondents in the first survey and 85% of the respondents in the second survey reported praying five times per day. [31] The results for mosque attendance were more evenly distributed. [32] Thus, the extremely high percentage of respondents who reported praying five times a day makes it difficult to statistically discern whether a correlation exists between the independent variable (prayer frequency) and the dependent variable (support for suicide bombings). While the Ginges study authors disconfirmed the religious-belief hypothesis, a correlation may be shown to exist between indicia of religious devotion and behaviors that increase the likelihood that one is sympathetic to violence once the bias introduced by the self reporting of acts associated with piousness is removed. Indeed, the confirmed hypothesis for coalitional commitment, insofar as mosque attendance is also a measure of religious devotion, suggests the Ginges study authors might have too hastily rejected the religious-belief hypothesis.
A primary purpose of this survey is to pursue the religious-belief hypothesis in the context of praxis, or the measurable adherence toSharia’s legal dictates of prayer worship and dress by Muslim worshippers who are sufficiently devout to pray in mosques. Specifically, this survey seeks to measure whether a correlation exists between measures of religious devotion as defined by certain behaviors objectively linked to Sharia adherence, on the one hand, and the presence of violence-positive materials at the mosque, on the other. This study also seeks to measure whether a correlation exists between the presence of violence-positive materials at a mosque and whether the mosque or mosque leadership will promote violence by recommending the study of violence-positive materials, promoting violent jihad, or inviting guest speakers who are known to have promoted violent jihad. However, this survey avoids the bias that might be introduced through self-reporting resulting from pressure on the respondent to demonstrate his or her piety. Read the rest on:
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